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The title of this oration is the “Fate of Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the
Developing Countries”. In this oration I question the uncritical transfer of Western
democratic value systems to the newly democratising societies. Within this perspec-
tive, I also reflect briefly on the commonalties between the ethos influencing demo-
cratic and development intervention.
My starting point is factual and is intended to provide a contextual background to the
tenets of what would follow.
By the end of the Second World War, Western countries were preoccupied with
various programmes to promote democracy in the developing countries and the
remaining colonies. These early democratisation efforts were part of a Western for-
eign policy premised in the democratic peace doctrine. The common aim was to leave
behind democratic regimes similar to those of Western countries, therefore deterring
the expansion of communism.
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, and at the height of the Cold War, democratic
support programmes were continued as part of anti-communism strategy also part of
the democratic peace doctrine. Democratic and none democratic means were used to
realise this endeavour, including, among other things, funding of political parties,
propaganda support, counter-espionage and “dirty wars”. It did not take long before
programmes to export democracy began to come to terms with their dismal failure.
Instead of democratising state and civil society, military coups, one-party states
and military socialism were in evidence in large parts of the developing world. As a
result of these early democratisation setbacks, political order rather than democratic
consolidation dominated the debate. In fact, many western intellectuals and policy
institutions were even inclined to lend support to what was then considered “enlight-
ened dictatorships”. Many authoritarian regimes from Mobutu of Zaire to Pinochet of
Chile were considered enlightened dictators.
However, despite this anticlimax, the democratic support programmes were not
abandoned but continued in a lesser ambitious fashion. The Western powers contin-
ued to extend democratic assistance in two dialectical fields: electoral reform and the
administration of justice.
By the 1990s the end of the Cold War has created a new global reality, with a
renewed concern with democratic and civil society support programmes. This time,
the debate has turned full circle to embody a revived political development under the
guise of modernisation revisionism. The current period is characterised by a world-
wide acceptance of the primacy of the triple heritage of democracy, human rights and
good governance.
With this background in mind, I do not intend to explain the internal factors
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that have hindered democratic consolidation in the developing countries. These con-
cerns are well researched, are still being debated and will be debated in the academic
and policy circles for decades to come.
My intention here is to trace Western concerns with democratic intervention to
the domain of European values in international relations. I try to respond to the
question what is the antecedence of the core values of Western political thought that
made intervention to promote democracy in the developing countries permissible.
In dealing with this question I trace democratic intervention to the continued
presence of the historic notion of liberal internationalism and two allied concepts:
domestic analogy and public sphere.
I argue these concepts, although originally not intended to explain democratic
transition in the developing countries, provide a very useful framework for under-
standing the core values behind democratic intervention.
However, to do so, these concepts should acquire new meanings driven from the
fact that all Western democracies whether liberal, social democratic or conservative,
have subscribed to the ethos of liberal internationalism. The advance of these con-
cepts has also been driven in part by the desirability of liberal attitudes over authori-
tarian and totalising regimes.
Liberal internationalism, domestic analogy and public sphere should be seen in
relation to the ethos of enlightenment and modernity. Of particular reference here is
the relationship between the domestic analogy and progress and the idea that a delib-
erate secularisation of culture and social life would contribute to the spread of uni-
versal values, such as democracy and development. The ultimate goal of progress
therefore is the encapsulation of non-western traditions into western value systems.
On the other hand, perhaps a liberal internationalism perspective could explain the
promise and peril of the democratisation project under way. It could even defy a
powerful tradition, which presumes that concepts developed in the West are not
amenable to explaining the peculiarity of the politics of developing countries.
WHAT IS THEN THE PROMISE OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM?
In this respect, the relationship between spreading the ethos of liberal international-
ism is found in the fact that both have deployed the domestic analogy. This also could
explain why programmes to democratise developing countries were implemented by
agencies with long experience in development support. In fact democracy is often
treated as an institutional mechanism for better development intervention. Being so
much concerned with technical democratic support, development agencies often
unwittingly pursue policy objectives that are indifferent to the complexities of the
politics of developing countries.
In general, no matter how development aid agencies try to justify intervention to
promote democracy in the developing countries, one of the main neglected aspects is
the continued presence of liberal internationalism.
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At a larger synthesis, democracy support programmes are clear indication that
the Western powers have not given up on an historical mission centred on progress.
This mission is also intended to expand a universal perspective on democracy centred
on the importance of defending individual liberty within the context of a national or
international community guided by the rule of law (Long 1996, p. 183).
This perspective in my view is a function of the interplay between liberal inter-
nationalism, the domestic analogy and a particularly desired public sphere, a
Western-style public sphere.
The basic rationalist assumption, I dare to say, here is that the spread of the
ethos of liberal internationalism would result in fostering attitudes such as 1
● The centrality of the individual, hence individualism;
● Liberty;
● The possibility of rendering the state responsible to the governed;
● Positive attitude towards the market; and
● Progress and enlightenment or development
However, conventionally and in much of the debate, the fate of democracy in the
developing world has often been explained with respect to the following factors:
a) Abject poverty and inequality;
b) Elite hegemony;
c) Distorted governance institutions;
d) Weak civil society; and
e) External pressures to replicate western-style democracies.
The perspective on positive liberal attitudes and values and that on the fate of
democracy are dialectical opposites. One explains the absence democracy as a prod-
uct of conditions internal to the developing countries. The other explains the absence
of democracy as a product of the developing countries inability to develop the socio-
economic conditions favourable for the diffusion of western-style democracy.2
Liberal internationalism is an optimistic project in which no state is absolutely inde-
pendent in restricting the liberty of its own individual citizens, nor the individual citizens
of other states. Three of the core values of liberal internationalism are instructive:
1. Expanding individual liberty would ultimately expand the rights of sovereign
individuals within and across states. Hence liberal internationalism is justified in
envisaging liberty as a universal value.
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1 For more on this see Festenstein 1998, Rawls 1993, Miller 1991, Mills 1991.
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2. As a doctrine against despotism and authoritarianism, liberal internationalism
also contends that only governments based upon the consent of the governed are
legitimate, and that such governments exist for the sole purpose of protecting
rights (Pennock 1950, p. 12);
3. Liberal internationalists are not off the mark in arguing that the prevalence of
democratic states the world-over, would foster the democratic peace.
However, behind the optimism of liberal internationalism there is the con-
tention that the values extended are perceived as superior to those replaced. This con-
tention raises a number of questions, not least about whether it is possible, or indeed
desirable, to mould the world into political arrangements similar to those of the West.
Let us also contemplate the compelling evidence that so far Western democratic prin-
ciples, with all their promise are “neither self-evident nor universally accepted”
(Weale 1999, p. 3). This does not mean that these values are fundamentally wrong or
have not worked well for Western societies.
Nevertheless, in my view, the fate of democracy in the developing countries lies
in liberal internationalism’s deliberate efforts to uncritically replicate the ethos of the
Western democratic nation-state at a global scale. Obviously, attempts to replicate a
universal blueprint of democratic institutes in every country, every society and every
political culture have proven difficult if not impossible.
Obviously the domestic analogy has failed because there are no analogous
domestic public spheres. Could we then conclude that the domestic analogy has no
potential for advancing the cause of democracy in the developing countries? Before
answering this question, let me establish a few parameters that may assist us in
exploring this question further.
DOMESTIC ANALOGY: THE TOOL KIT 
Western democratic nations aspire to export democracy and good governance to the
developing countries. There is even contemplation in some Western circles and
democracy lobby groups to advance their particular version of democracy to the
developing world. In this sense, the reconstruction of the domestic analogy takes two
perspectives:
● One is concerned with exporting consensus, presidential, parliamentary and
other forms of democratic governments.
● The other with advancing the ethos of liberal internationalism on which there is
a convergence of interests among all Western democracies.
In both perspectives, the domestic analogy hinges on the assumption that the polit-
ical and legal principles that have sustained the Western democratic state are transferable
as principles for the maintenance of a democratic peace in the developing countries.
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Here, the domestic analogy is developed into a presumptive reasoning, which holds that
there are certain similarities between domestic and international phenomena.
In particular, it argues, the conditions of order within states, argues liberal inter-
nationalism, are similar to those necessary for order between them; and that therefore
the institutions, which sustain order and secure competitive and inclusive political
participation domestically, should also be reproduced at the global level”.3
Ironically, many intellectuals from the developing countries join Western critics
of the domestic analogy, although for different reasons. They fear that only the
domestic institutions of Western societies would be selected for replication at the
global level and those of the developing countries will be relegated to oblivion.
In this perspective, liberal internationalism assumes that democracy provides
appropriate institutional mechanisms for political engagement. These institutional
mechanisms were considered sufficient ethical and moral reasoning for curbing the
state’s ability to abuse the human and civil rights of its sovereign citizens.4 However,
in the circles of the elite of developing countries, a question is often whispered as to
whether the long-term objective of liberal internationalism is to create a global gov-
ernment under Western dominance.5
Evidently, it is legitimate and even desirable to intervene to protect human and
civil rights in totalitarian and authoritarian states or persuade others in order to
expand the democratic peace. Here again many intellectuals from the developing
countries would join the international pacifists’ perception of intervention as an
expansion of liberal imperialism by other means.
In retrospect, let us not forget that there is an equally strong common percep-
tion in many developing countries that, the triumph of liberal internationalism over
liberal imperialism has probably produced more tangible results than the triumph of
liberal internationalism over socialism. Obviously, the regimes of truth on which such
arguments and counter-arguments are based are difficult to verify.
Let me conclude this point by introducing the main differences between the public
sphere in the Western and developing countries.
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4 If the state is authoritarian and not accountable to its citizens then, the best guarantee of
democratic peace between nations is “a super-state or world state as holder of legal monop-
oly of international force” (Zolo 1997, p.29). Because democracies do not go to war against
each other, so argue liberal internationalists, the domestic analogy is applicable only amongst
democracies (Beitz 1979, 1983, Doyle 1986, 1995). It is here that we observe a positive associ-
ation between democracy and peace in limiting the monopoly of coercive force of the state
5 Weale 1999, pp. 16-7. See also Rawls’s argument that “political arrangements in any democrat-
ic system that respect competing and incompatible conceptions of the good nevertheless
appeal to the common political purpose of achieving peace” (Rawls 1993, p.14).
The incompatibility of the domestic analogy and Western misconception of the
nature of the public sphere in the developing countries are amongst the main factors
behind the fate of democracy. Unfortunately after decades of intervention using these
concepts implicitly or explicitly, the democratisation projects were able to replicate
only the form and not the content of Western democracies.
THE PUBLIC SPHERE: ANALOGOUS OR INCOMPATIBLE
The democratisation process currently underway in the developing countries operates
within a very narrowly defined public sphere. The so-called ‘modern forces’ of private
business, non-state institutions, trade unions, religious organisations, social move-
ments, pressure groups etc dominate this public sphere. Because most of states in the
developing countries do not consider “traditional political organisations” part of civil
society, groups organised on ethnic basis are agonisingly absent from this public
sphere, even though they constitute the political parties both in government and
opposition.
Most developing states ban ethnically based political parties, accusing them of being
backward, divisive, relics of the past and a potential source of national disintegration.
Nonetheless, the educated political elite across the developing world uses ethnicity as
an instrument of political mobilisation, a function of elite competition and control of
state power and resources. Considering the complexities political culture poses, liberal
internationalists preferred to close their eyes to non-democratic practises, including
the exclusion of “traditional” political institutions and groups organised with the aim
of agitating for the recognition of collective rights.
However, judged against the harsh realities of the developing countries, the pub-
lic sphere, an arena where civil society creates space for resistance, makes demands
and protects rights, is often absorbed by the state. Unfortunately, in most cases, the
state remains the main political force in the vocal modern sector, yet it is these pow-
erful minority interests which dominate the public sphere.
In other words, in most of the developing countries, civil society is too small to
have a felt effect in the public sphere; and is too weak to be politically effective
beyond protesting decisions that affects it negatively. Although every civil society is
divided, with all major actors compete to represent and protect their interests, in the
developing countries it is severely divided.
Just as the public sphere in Western societies is heterogeneous, so too is the pub-
lic sphere in developing countries divided into factions. Unlike the developing coun-
tries, most of which were under colonial rule for centuries, Western societies have
developed the basic infrastructure for the co-existence of multiple public spheres
capable of creating demands and counter demands on the state.6
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In the West, the public sphere is created in and out of civil society; it is not
absorbed into the state, but addresses the state and the public concerns on which
state-sponsored public policies might impact. It is based on the concept that public
goods are distinct from private interests and on forms of private life that prepare
individuals to act as autonomous or sovereign citizen. Above all, a responsibly func-
tioning civil society depends on social institutions that empower the individual to
participate in the public sphere independent of cleavage, power or patronage
(Calhoun 1996, p. 459).
Conversely, I would argue that, in the developing countries, the functioning of
these public spheres and their emancipatory potential has in many instances been
hampered by individualism - one of the core liberal attitudes. The creeping effect of
individualism cannot be ignored and its political consequences cannot be overlooked.
This is particularly true if the emancipatory potential of individualism has unwitting-
ly allowed to retard the social potential embedded in community and collective action
- the main organising principles in most developing countries.
The consequences of misconceiving the domestic analogy as a vehicle for spread-
ing democracy is that the donor driven democratisation project has, in some
instances, produced unwanted results culminating in ethnic and religious conflicts
such as those experienced by over 38 democratising developing countries during the
last two decades.
In the same vein and with reference to comparative democracy, I am positively
perplexed by a conceptualisation offered by my colleague Professor Rudy Andeweg,
who argues in a recent paper on Consociational Democracy that while democracy is
potentially unstable some democracies are paradoxically stable. The Paradox of stable
democracy, according to Professor Andeweg (2000: 506) stems from the possibility
that the destabilising factors in divided societies are neutralised at the elite level by
embracing non-majoritarian mechanisms of conflict resolution. Obviously, non-
majoritarian mechanisms raise issue with democracies based on first-past-the-post,
although embraces the tradition of consociational democracy.
In pursuing this argument very closely, paradoxically in the developing coun-
tries, the puzzle of unstable democracy stems from the reverse. In primordial severely
divided societies, civil society is narrowly defined and the elite is too concerned with
patronage and rent seeking to cement consensus. The situation is even graver when
majoritarian tyranny is superimposed by a liberal internationalism adamant in its
believe that the domestic analogy is deliverable. Because the public sphere in develop-
ing countries is severely divided, the responsibilities of government are in most cases
misconstrued for private gains, the rule of law is hardly upheld and the determination
of public policy by consent is far fetched.
In revisiting the paradox of the stable democracy, it is obvious that the factors
that have heralded democratic stability in the West are, in my view, the very ones that
have determined the fate of the unstable democracy in the developing world.
In severely divided societies in the developing countries, ethnic, religious,
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regional, linguistic and other attributes of political culture are so strong that it is
impossible to confront “community” and collective action by individualism. This is
because, developing countries, societies are organised according to collective interests,
some of which is often detrimental to individual interests in the Western sense. In
such circumstances, the public sphere is quite different from the domestic analogy
envisaged by liberal internationalism.7
In Western countries, the public sphere constitutes the space that informs over-
lapping political entities and diffuses them into private interests. Because differentia-
tion is one of the main factors determining inclusiveness as well as quality of partici-
pation in the public sphere, there must be some cultural peculiarity attached to the
liberal tradition.8 And so too there is also embeddedness of the political culture
prevalent in the developing countries. I hasten to add that not all aspects of this polit-
ical culture are detrimental to democratic acceptance or have nothing to offer in the
democratic process.
FAILING THE TEST OF REALITY
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me introduce a brief case from which I would like to draw some conclusions as to
why despite the obvious differences that exist between Western and developing coun-
tries public spheres, multilateral institutions such as the United Nations still believe
that the domestic analogy is possible.
Here I draw on the case of Africa with particular reference to the democratisa-
tion and good governance policy framework of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP). One of ECA and UNDP main policy guidelines for fostering democracy
and good governance in then African continent reads as follows:
“There is the need that the African states revisit African traditions and culture in
the effort to reduce the perverse effects of an alien culture in post-colonial
Africa”.
In its face value, this policy guideline illustrates that these two multilateral insti-
tutions are aware of the role political culture can play in advancing the democratisa-
tion and good governance agenda. In fact, it seems as if ECA and UNDP have redis-
covered that there is an African political culture, with some positive attributes from
which the democratisation efforts could tap.
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tained only through group identity, the emancipatory potential of individualism as embed-
ded in liberal thought could hardly be realised.
8 Refer to Parekh (1993) Cultural Peculiarity of Liberal Democracy”.
In reality, neither ECA nor UNDP has devoted any effort to explore how African
traditions and culture could become vehicles for a democratisation initiative different
from that advanced by liberal internationalism.
In fact, ECA’s and UNDP’s hastened to align themselves with the powerful dis-
course of liberal internationalism. Policy guideline nine of the African Good
Governance Forum states that:
“African governments must sign on to international conventions on
democracy and good governance as in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development and (OECD) and Development Assistance
Countries (DAC).”
This, in my view, gives little comfort to Africans who wish to own the democrat-
ic process. ECA and UNDP have, out of their free will, invited liberal international-
ism’s conception of the domestic analogy. They used OECD and DAC experiences as
a blueprint and by doing so made the democratisation process subservient to the very
alien culture that they have earlier rebuked. The call for replicating OECD and DAC
democratic models have surely stifled Africans’ ability to explore whether African’s
political culture has some democratic elements that could be creatively adapted to
Western liberal values.
The results of the democratisation process are impressive if we judge them from
the pure notion of democratic transition. During the last two decades, the African
continent has witnessed 26 democratic transitions from one party states, military and
military socialist regimes to multi-party democratic states.
However, during the same period, Africa has endured 14 military coups, 8 of
them succeed in overthrowing the democratically elected governments. Out of these
14 military coups 7 military leaders changed their military uniforms into civilian
clothes in engineered elections that have reinvented them as new borne democrats. In
the process of these transitions 12 state parties such as ZANU-PF, KANU and other
that had dominated political life during authoritarian regimes retained power
through questionable electoral processes. The citizens of countries such as Zimbabwe,
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Kenya, among others have by and large been con-
fronted with democracies without democrats.
Apparently, the political leadership of these countries that presumed themselves
democratic has cashed into the global democratic tied by satisfying the minimalist
requirements demanded by liberal internationalism.
Generally, the quality of these democracies is questionable. As we have seen in
recent history some newly democratising states have continued to be a source of fear
vis-à-vis the human rights of their citizens.9 Such conditions prevail in countries such
as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Angola, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Gambia, Nigeria,
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among others. In these, and many other countries, democracy is largely used as an
instrument of oppression, whereby minorities and the disfranchised sectors of the
population continued to be excluded and the satisfaction of their basic material needs
neglected. Human rights reports on 29 of the democratising countries have shown
that virtual democracies have failed to bring about the democratic dividend that
many Africans have anticipated.
Superimposing, what ECA and UNDP call the ethos of an alien political culture
on African polity has in turn reinforced public scepticism and hence distorted the
process of democratic consolidation. Probably, had they sought of applying the prin-
ciple of creative adaptation these multilateral institutions, like other bilateral agencies
might have produced better results rather than insisting on applying what ECA and
UNDP have described as an alien culture.
Liberal internationalism’s insistence on the domestic analogy, at times without
questioning its efficacy has muted the emergence of globally diverse and pluralistic
democratic models shaped by the histories and realities of the developing countries.
Obviously, due to different levels of economic and technological development, the
public sphere differs qualitatively among developing countries, and probably among
most Western societies as well- let alone between developed and developing societies.
LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR THE ORDINARY
Before, concluding this oration let me explore the connections between the core val-
ues that inform development and democratic intervention. An allied question is what
does the domestic analogy have to do with development in general and politics of
development in particular.
First, both democracy and development are part of the optimism inherent in lib-
eral internationalism and its believe in the domestic analogy. The tenets of this argu-
ment found their antecedence in enlightenment and modernity. They usher in the
conviction that if enlightenment and progress were possible in one society, they must
be possible and duly transferable to other societies.
Second, both democracy and development are premised on the idea of growth:
one privileges political, social and moral growth, the other ushers in the importance
of economic growth.
Third, democracy and development are culturally embedded and therefore they
operate well within institutions that have integrated the core values consistent with both.
Forth, because of the apparent complexity involved in creating an analogy
between Western and developing countries public spheres, both development and
democratic intervention never questioned whether other peoples too have their ver-
sions of democracy and perceptions of development.
Is it not obvious that liberal internationalism has been searching for what it has
misconceived as an ordinary driven from Western political cultures and not those of
the developing countries? 
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This reminds me of the writings of my South African colleague Professor
Njabulo Ndebele on “South Africa and the Rediscovery of the Ordinary” (Ndebele
1985). In his work Professor Ndebele laments, it took the people of South Africa, with
all their shades and colours, more than a century to discover the ordinary.
Rediscovering the ordinary in Professor Ndebele’s view is about rediscovering human
worth and democracy’s capacity to redeem politics of it lethal consequences.
Is it not ironic that the ordinary is yet to be discovered, let alone rediscovered.
Despite the common assumption that the ordinary is known and does not require
much pondering, most of the questions that have engaged human thought and cre-
ativity belong to the realm of the ordinary.
In no area of human ingenuity has the search for the ordinary been more daunt-
ing than in the contested domains of democracy and the possibilities it could offer
for individual freedom and collective well-being. It is in this perspective that liberal
internationalism, with all its optimism and promise has failed to see democracy as an
embedded and desirable human value as well as a constellation of diverse ordinaries.
There must be some twists and turns that we could have contemplated in the
search for the ordinary. Concepts such as liberal internationalism, the domestic anal-
ogy and public sphere could be redefined and enlarged in order to explain new, com-
plex and diverse realities. The alternative is to render the democratic process hostage
to a hopelessly narrow conception incapable of capturing the evolving realities, mes-
sages and meanings that we espouse to understand.
Ladies and gentlemen before I leave this august podium, I have some words of
thanks to make. My thanks are due to you Meneer Rector Magnificus, the Dean of the
Social Sciences, the Chair of the Department of Political Science and my colleagues at
the Department of Political Science. Thanks also to my friend and colleague Professor
Hans Opschoor, the Rector of the Institute of Social Studies and my colleagues and
students from the Institute of Social Studies.
Collaborative teaching and promotion of PhD students between Department of
Political Science and the Institute of Social Studies has already begun, with three PhD
promotions underway. Two Leiden colleagues will take part in teaching at the
Institute of Social Studies, while I will also start teaching a course on NGOs, State and
Civil Society in the Developing Countries here in Leiden early next year.
Ladies and gentlemen
There are many family, friends and colleagues who came from abroad to attend this
ceremony. I would like to thank and acknowledge the presence of Professor Holger
Bernt Hansen, the Director of the Centre of African Studies, Copenhagen University
in Denmark and the Chair of the Board of Directors of the Danish Authority for
International Development (Danida), our equivalent of DGIS.
Thanks and much gratitude to Professor Rene Devisch of the Centre of
Development Studies at the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium; Professor
Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmed, the Executive Secretary of the Organisation for
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Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, Ethiopia.
I have also recognise colleagues and students from the University of Amsterdam,
the Free University of Amsterdam, Utrecht, Njimegen, Rotterdam and other Dutch
Universities for whom I’m most grateful.
From the family side, I extend many thanks and much gratitude to my parents-
in-law Heinrich and Gertrude Brons, and all members of the German delegation.
I cannot possibly mention everybody by name during the time available to this
oration. All what I can say is thanks to all of you for taking this afternoon to be here
with us and for your friendship, collegiality and unfailing support.
I reserve many special thanks and much gratitude to my wife, Maria Brons and
our two daughters Norika and Johanna for allowing me much liberty, not only to
work hard, but also to travel far and wide. Like most liberties, mine too has to be con-
strained so that I take up my household choirs.
Ik heb gezegd
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